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Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the
advance of technology.
The question.., is what limits there are upon this
power of technology to shrink the realm of
guaranteed privacy. 2
Well-established legal principles govern evidentiary
issues arising from technology developments. 3 In the United
States, the Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals in every
circuit draw from non-computer and non-wireless Fourth
Amendment doctrine to address nascent electronic evidence
issues. I agree that legal analyses drawing from historical
treatment can be effective, but will argue in this Article that
Internet access raises difficult legal issues to which standard
Fourth Amendment analysis cannot be easily applied.
Furthermore, the analyses will become more difficult with the
introduction of wireless Internet access. 4 As wireless Internet
connectivity burgeons throughout the world, unsecure
connections5 will likely become a haven for illegal activity.
Courts should consider and investigate the unique issues
presented by wireless Internet access in depth to avoid setting
unwanted precedents when they are, inevitably, presented with
a defendant whose wireless connection was used to commit a
crime.
1 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (citing
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986)).
2 Id. (citing Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989)).
3 See, e.g., id. at 33-34.
4 "Wireless Internet access," Wireless Internet," "wireless
access," "wireless network," and "wireless connection" are used
interchangeably in this paper, although each has a slightly different
meaning. All five terms are used herein to describe a network configuration
where the owner has a single wireless access point connected to the Internet
via an Internet Service Provider (ISP). The owner has a computer (either a
desktop or laptop) with a wireless modem used to connect to the wireless
access point. The wireless access point can be a hub, router, or any similar
device. See generally Tracey Meyers, 802.11, What really is Wi-Fi?,
NET4NOWT (Aug. 21, 2003) , at http://www.net4nowt.com/isp-news/
news article.asp?NewsID=1219.
5 WorldWideWarDrive.org occasionally conducts informal
surveys across the globe to determine how many wireless access points are
detectable and unsecure. The most recent effort, "WWWD3," was conducted
June 28, 2003, through July 5, 2003. WWWD3 revealed 88,122 access points.
67% did not have encryption enabled. WorldWideWarDrive.org at
http://www.worldwidewardrive.org (Dec. 18, 2003).
2004-2005
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ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE
A. NOVEL ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE ISSUES
In the first section of this paper, I will describe Fourth
Amendment doctrine governing warrantless computer searches
in the United States. This area of the law is unsettled. Although
this paper treats only relevant United States law, the normative
claims advanced are equally relevant to courts throughout the
world. In countries experiencing rapid growth in the use of
technology, such as China or countries that are part of the
European Union, courts, government prosecutors, defendants
and technology users will face the same evidentiary challenges
as are discussed in this paper.
Enough cases with similar facts have percolated through
United States courts that even though Fourth Amendment law
governing technology is unsettled, meaningful distinctions can
be drawn among opinions. I focus on courts' attempts to apply
well-established warrantless search requirements to cases
where electronic evidence is collected for use in a criminal
prosecution. Courts loosely follow the Supreme Court's method
for interpreting new search and seizure issues. Nevertheless, I
discuss some courts' evaluations of search and seizure issues
raised by technology to establish a basis for further discussion.
In 2003, two courts addressed this issue and arguably expanded
the boundaries of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 6 By using
a set of hypothetical facts, I will examine the factors a court
considers both (1) in determining whether a private searcher is
considered a government agent for Fourth Amendment
purposes, and (2) in determining the permissible scope of a
government search following a private one.
In the second section of this paper, I examine a series of
legal issues that I anticipate arising from offenses committed via
unsecure wireless networks. 7 Once a government official has
evidence gathered from a private, warrantless search like the
6 See United States v. Jarrett, 338 F.3d 339 (4th Cir. 2003)
(finding no Fourth Amendment violation where FBI knew of and tacitly
acknowledged warrantless search by hacker searching for electronic
evidence); New York v. Emerson, 766 N.Y.S.2d 482 (Sup. Ct. 2003) (finding
no Fourth Amendment violation where government viewed more files than
the preceding warrantless private search because court found viewing more
files not did not exceed scope of initial private search).
7 See Richard Shim, Wi-Fl Arrest Highlights Security Dangers,
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hypothetical one set forth in the first section, both the
government and the defendant face additional challenges of
proof if the defendant used a wireless network in the
commission of the crime. Should the government be entitled to a
presumption that the evidence on the computer belongs to the
owner? How could the defendant prove it was not he who used
his network connection to commit an offense? If the defendant
ran an unsecure wireless hub, should courts consider him as
having facilitated offenses committed by others? Should the
defendant be liable to third-party victims of offenses committed
by a person who hijacked his wireless Internet connection? Is a
defendant negligent by not securing his wireless Internet
connection? Courts will have to grapple with such evidentiary
questions in the near future. Although the potential answers in
this context are expected to run parallel to those from existing
theories of liability and culpability, they do not. Because
wireless Internet legal questions are new, they cannot yet be
analyzed comprehensively. In this paper, I set out existing law,
pose potential issues raised by wireless network use, and
suggest how the law might be applied or how it may evolve.
B. HYPOTHETICAL FACTS
Fourth Amendment analyses are highly fact-specific. 8
Because of this, I will use a set of hypothetical facts to frame the
electronic evidence search and seizure discussion throughout the
paper. The hypothetical facts are as follows:
While servicing a customer's computer, a
computer repair technician ("the Technician")
discovered files he believed were indicative of
criminal conduct: receipt and possession of child
pornography under 18S UT.S.(. § 2252(a)(5)(BX).
8 United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1276 (10th Cir. 1998)
("Having reached [a] conclusion, however, we are quick to note these results
are predicated only upon the particular facts of this case, and a search of
computer files based on different facts might produce a different result.").
9 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(5)(B). Section 2252(a)(5)(B) criminalizes
"knowing[] possess[ion] [of] a computer disk "that contains an image of child
pornography produced with materials shipped in interstate commerce."
(Emphasis added). Electronic evidence raises suspicion of crimes other than
child pornography. In United States v. Carey a repairperson suspected
electronic pictures indicated illegal drug enterprise activities. 172 F.3d at
1270. Similarly, electronic documents could raise suspicions of terrorism-
related activities. Because evidence of crimes other than child pornography is
2004-2005
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ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE
After alerting law enforcement authorities, the
Technician searched the computer again and
uncovered additional evidence. The government
seeks to admit evidence obtained by the Technician
at a later trial and search the rest of the computer.
The customer (-Defendant X-) claims he
nevTer vi ewed, downloaded or otherwise access;,-ed
child pornography. Defendant X accesses a
broadband Internet connection from his home using
a wireless hub and modem. The hub, because it is
used with default factory-configured settings,
permits any computer with a wireless modem
within 100 to 500 feet to access it automatically.
Gaining access to Defendant X's,- hub p~rovTides
access to the Internet via Defendant X's,- broadband
Internet connection. Defendant X claims the actual
perpetrator ("Perpetrator Y"), unibeknow'nst to
Defendant X, accessed the Internet throug-h
Defendant X's wireless hub, gaining access to and
viewing child pornography images. Perpetrator Y
then used a simple file transfer application to store
the images on Defendant X's computer for
subsequent Viewing. These images are the pictures
the Technician later discovXTered on Defendant X's
computer when he brought it in for servi\TCing.1
Perpetrator Y is,- probably liable for sevTe ral
civil1 and criminal offens,-es, becaus,-e of his conduct.
Federal law explicitly prohibits intentional or
attempted interception of electronic
communication, InI tr'ansit by both government and
private citizens uinder 1S U-.S.C. § 2511. Federal
law also prohibits unauthorized intentional access
to storedl electronic communications under § 2701
and unauthorized access to computers in general
under § 1030. 10) Furthermore, Defendant X may be
more likely to raise First Amendment issues, they are not treated herein.
This paper uses child pornography as its hypothetical crime because a
layperson can more easily identify child pornography than most other genres
of electronic evidence. Cf United States v. Grimes, 244 F.3d 375, 378 (5th
Cir. 2001); United States v. Hall, 142 F.3d 988, 995 (7th Cir. 1998).
10 Many states have similar statutes. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 708-895.7 (2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-251 (West 2003); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 638:17 (2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:38A-3 (West 2003).
SWAMINATHA
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entitled to civil damages from Perpetrator Y as
provided in § 2520. Althoug -h not addressed in the
scope of this paiper, offenses committed under §§
10:30, 2511, 2520, and 2701 via wireless networks
creaite chaiellees for both prosecution and defense.
In the context of the hypothetical scenario, I address the
following evidentiary issues related to electronic evidence
collection: (1) whether the evidence collected by the Technician
in the initial search can be admitted; (2) whether the evidence
collected by the Technician after contacting the government can
be admitted; and (3) whether evidence collected by the
government during a warrantless search of Defendant X's
computer beyond those files the Technician accessed or viewed
during his initial search can be admitted. Further, I set out
problems facing Defendant X in defending himself against
crimes he alleges Perpetrator Y committed; and potential civil
claims against Defendant X by third parties. The issues
analyzed under existing law highlight problems that arise by
drawing analogies to existing theories of liability.
II. ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE AND PRIVATE SEARCHES
A. EVOLUTION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE
Legal principles, including those concerning Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, evolve with technological advances.
When deciding novel Fourth Amendment issues, the Supreme
Court first determines whether a certain government act
violates the Fourth Amendment, the Court first determines
whether the search and seizure would have been unlawful under
the common law when the Fourth Amendment was written.11
Only when this inquiry produces no answer does the Court turn
to a "modern balancing test" 12 to evaluate the intrusion. The
modern test balances the degree of intrusion on an individual's
privacy with the need for the intrusion in order to promote
legitimate governmental interests. 13 As Tracey Maclin notes,
11 Tracey Macln, Let Sleeping Dogs Lie: Why the Supreme
Court Should Leave Fourth Amendment History Unabridged, 82 B.U. L. REV.
895, 896 (2002) (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299 (1999)
(legal analysis of a Fourth Amendment challenge to a police intrusion)).
12 Id. (citing Wyoming, 526 U.S. at 299).
13 Wyoming, 526 U.S. at 299.
2004-2005
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however, the Court considered historical common law in just one
out of eleven Fourth Amendment cases in its 2000 and 2001
terms. 14 Maclin argues that lower courts are left with
insufficient "guidance on when or why history makes a
difference" 15 in Fourth Amendment interpretation. Lower courts
quietly ignore the Supreme Court's suggested historical
analysis. 16
Courts of appeals have similarly neglected to consider
common law principles. For example, in United States v. Carey,
the Tenth Circuit examined the reasonableness of a police
officer's search of a computer for child pornography. 17 Framing
its Fourth Amendment inquiry, the court professed to follow the
Supreme Court's guidance and began with a historical
analysis.18 The court shed no light on common law search and
seizure concerns in the 1700s except noting that it must consider
that a search could not "constitute[] general rummaging in
'flagrant disregard' for the terms of the warrant."1 9 Having
apparently fulfilled its duty to history, the court then, as most
do, examined the current doctrine of warrantless police
searches 20 without further historical discussion.
This method of examining 18th century Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence is ineffective for determining 21st
century Fourth Amendment electronic evidence issues. Professor
Terrance Sandalow has stated that "[a]n understanding of the
current meaning of . . . clauses limiting governmental power,
depends far more on familiarity with the history of the twentieth
century than of the latter years of the eighteenth."21 Analyses of
electronic evidence issues are difficult to parse, and their
outcomes are difficult to predict for two reasons. First, Fourth
14 Maclin, supra note 11, at 896, 972. Maclin disputes the
Court's claim that history is the departure point for every case it will decide.
Id.
15 Id. at 899.
16 C. id. at 971-72.
17 United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d at 1270 (analyzing
reasonableness "in light of what was reasonable at the time of the Fourth
Amendment's adoption").
18 Id. at 1272 (analyzing reasonableness "in light of what was
reasonable at the time of the Fourth Amendment's adoption").
19 Id. (quoting United States v. Foster, 100 F.3d 846, 849 (10th
Cir. 1996)).
20 Id. at 1272.
21 Maclin, supra note 11, at 971 (quoting Terrance Sandalow,
Constitutional Interpretation, 79 U. MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1050 (1981)).
SWAMINATHA
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Amendment analyses in particular are highly fact-specific.
Second, where the common law sheds no light on the case at
hand, the courts will determine an intrusion's legality under a
modern balancing test that proceeds with little guidance. 22 The
increasing pervasiveness of wireless networks will only
exacerbate the difficulties in crafting workable, predictable
balancing tests or defining appropriate presumptions.
Perpetrators can gain access to wireless networks and use them
to commit crimes while going undetected with surprising ease.
The presumption that where electronic evidence is found on a
computer, knowledge of the evidence's existence can be imputed
to the owner of the computer should be challenged.
Presumptions are discussed below.23 Wireless network owners
could be facilitating the commission of crimes unknowingly. The
presumption that wireless network owners who fail to secure
their networks should not be liable to third parties for offenses
committed via their networks should also be challenged.
Liability to third parties is discussed below.24
B. TECHNOLOGY'S IMPACT ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
In Kyllo v. United States, the Supreme Court commented
on the impact technology has on Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, noting that technology has affected notions of
privacy. 25 By way of example, the Court noted that "the
technology enabling human flight has exposed to public view
(and hence, we have said, to official observation) uncovered
portions of the house and its curtilage that once were private." 26
The Court is mindful of the curious tension brought about by the
ability of technology to impact our notions of expected privacy.27
As a new type of technology become inextricably linked with
daily life, reasonable expectations of privacy are consequently
redefined.
"Americans' love affair with technology is one of the
defining characteristics of our culture."28 Internet penetration
22 See id. at 896.
23 See infra Part III.B. 1.
24 See infra Part III.B.2.
25 See 533 U.S. at 33-34.
26 Id. (citing California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986)).
27 Id.
28 JOHN B. HORRIGAN, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE
PROJECT, CONSUMPTION OF INFORMATION GOODS AND SERVICES IN THE UNITED
2004-2005
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in the United States reached sixty-three percent in April 2003.29
Wireless Internet access is predicted to reach forty-eight percent
of Internet users in the United States by 2005.30 Even while 69
percent of the population is not technologically proficient, 31 the
courts endeavor to keep pace with the 31 percent that is by
establishing electronic evidence jurisprudence. 32 In criminal
cases in particular, electronic evidence issues are increasingly
important. 33
C. WARRANTLESS SEARCHES
The hypothetical facts in this paper describe a
warrantless search of Defendant X's computer by a technician.
Courts consider two questions when determining if a
government warrantless search of a computer violates the
Fourth Amendment: (1) whether the search violates a
reasonable expectation of privacy,34 and if so, (2) whether the
STATES, i, (Nov. 23, 2003), available at
http ://www.pewinternet.org/reports/pdfs/ PIPInfoConsumption.pdf.
29 HORRIGAN, supra note 28, at 4. Some facets of electronic
evidence jurisprudence are unsettled or not fully realized. The Pew Report
provides a frame of reference for understanding the growing number of
individuals in the United States who may be effect by electronic evidence
jurisprudence. The Pew Report identifies three tech-savvy segments of the
American population: the "Young Tech Elites, the Wired GenXers, and the
Older Wired Baby Boomers." Id. at 5. Comprising one-third of the
population, these three tech-savvy segments crave information technology
and engage in intense information exchanges. Id. They spend more money on
technology goods and services than other, less tech-savvy segments of the
population. Id. The less tech-savvy use less technology due to lack of time,
experience, or levels of interest in information goods and services. Id.
30 See Press Release, Computer Industry Almanac, Inc.,
Internet Users Will Top 1 Billion in 2005 - Wireless Internet Users Will
Reach 48% in 2005 (Mar. 21, 2001), available at http://www.c-i-
a.com/pr032102.htm.
31 HORRIGAN, supra note 28, at 4.
32 Courts are no strangers to technology. Novel legal issues arise
and are settled by applying existing principles as courts come up to speed
with technology. See, e.g., Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27 (applying Fourth Amendment to
thermal imagery surveillance technology); Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514
(2001) (applying Fourth Amendment to intercepted cellular telephone
conversations); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (applying Fourth
Amendment to phone-booth conversation surveillance). This paper merely
suggests two current novel issues courts will need to solidify.
33 Amy Baron-Evans & Martin F. Murphy, The Fourth
Amendment in the Digital Age: Some Basics on Computer Searches, 47
BOSTON B. J. 10, 13 (2003).
34 See Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983).
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search can be considered reasonable because it falls within an
exception to the warrant requirement. 35
A search is constitutional if it does not violate a person's
"reasonable" or "legitimate" expectation of privacy. 36 This
inquiry embraces two discrete questions: first, whether the
individual's conduct reflects "an actual (subjective) expectation
of privacy," and second, whether the individual's subjective
expectation of privacy is "one that society is prepared to
recognize as 'reasonable."' 37  In most cases, the difficulty of
contesting a defendant's subjective expectation of privacy
focuses the analysis on the objective aspect of the test defined in
Katz v. United States,38  i.e., whether the individual's
expectation of privacy was reasonable.
No bright line rule indicates whether an expectation of
privacy is constitutionally reasonable. 39 For example, the
Supreme Court has held that a person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in property located inside a person's
home, 40 in "the relative heat of various rooms in the home"
revealed through the use of a thermal imager,41 in conversations
taking place in an enclosed phone booth,42 and in the contents of
opaque containers. 43 In contrast, the Court has held that a
person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in activities
conducted in open fields, 44 in garbage deposited at the outskirts
of real property,45 or in a stranger's house that the person has
entered without the owner's consent in order to commit a theft.
46
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable
government - not private - searches. Therefore, it does not
restrict the hypothetical Technician's initial search.47 If the
Technician also happens to be a confidential government
informant, he could be found to be acting as a government agent
35 See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185 (1990).
36 Katz, 389 U.S. at 362 (Harlan, J., concurring).
37 Id. at 361.
38 See id. at 347.
39 See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987).
40 See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980).
41 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27.
42 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 358.
43 See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822-23 (1982).
44 See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984).
45 See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988).
46 See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978)
47 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
2004-2005
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and not a private citizen. 48 Whether a confidential informant is
acting as a government agent is determined on a case-by-case
basis by the district judge.49  In a case analogous to the
hypothetical scenario, a United States district court suppressed
evidence of child pornography collected by a computer technician
because the technician was a government informant and not a
private citizen. 50
The Fourth Amendment protects an individual's privacy
from certain forms of government intrusion by prohibiting
unreasonable searches and seizures by government actors. 51
The Fourth Amendment is "wholly inapplicable to a search or
seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private
individual."52 If a court finds that the Technician acted as an
instrument or agent of the government when conducting the
search, however, the search is then subject to Fourth
Amendment restrictions.5 3
Federal courts use a multi-part test in determining
whether a private party has acted as a government agent. The
test includes (1) whether the government knew of and
acquiesced to the search; (2) whether the private party's purpose
was to assist law enforcement or was independently motivated;
and (3) whether the government requested the action or offered
a reward. 54 The defendant, Defendant X, bears the burden of
proving that the private party acted as an agent of the
government. 55 Federal courts note that determining an agency
relationship is a fact-intensive inquiry56 not unlike general
48 United States v. McAllister, 18 F.3d 1412, 1417 (7th Cir.
1994).
49 Id.
50 United States v. Barth, 26 F. Supp. 2d 929, 933-935 (W.D.
Tex. 1998).
51 Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656 (1980); Katz, 389
U.S. at 350.
52 Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113 (internal citations omitted).
53 McAllister, 18 F.3d at 1417 (citing United States v. Coolidge,
403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971)).
54 See, e.g., United States v. Crowley, 385 F.3d 553, 558 (7th
Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted).
55 See, e.g., United States v. Feffer, 831 F.2d 734, 737 (7th Cir.
1987).
56 See, e.g., United States v. Ellyson, 326 F.3d 522, 527 (citing
United States v. Koenig, 856 F.2d 843, 847 n.1 (7th Cir. 1988)).
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Fourth Amendment inquiries. Not all factors are weighted
equally. 57
1. TECHNICIAN'S AGENCY STATUS
Prior to contacting the government, the Technician
unquestionably acted as a private citizen. Under traditional
Fourth Amendment analysis, his subsequent searches could be
considered private searches as well, under the government agent
analysis. Thus, electronic evidence collected in the technician's
initial search will probably be admitted.
In United States v. Hal], on facts closely analogous to the
hypothetical facts, the Seventh Circuit conducted its government
agent analysis where a computer technician searched a
customer's computer and found evidence of child pornography
prior to contacting the government.58 The court concluded the
technician acted as a private citizen because the search was
conducted pursuant to the technician's work servicing the
computer for the sole purpose of testing the computer, the
government had no knowledge of the technician's search and the
government did not instruct the technician to inspect the files. 59
The court also noted in its analysis that the technician did not
contact the government until after the evidence was collected. 60
The Fourth Circuit has held that even if the technician
had attempted to aid the government, and the government both
knew of the search and failed to proscribe further inspection, the
search may still have been upheld. 61 In general, if a court finds
that the hypothetical Technician did not act as a government
agent, evidence collected in subsequent private searches by the
Technician will not be suppressed even after contacting law
enforcement authorities. Once a private searcher contacts the
57 See Feffer, 831 F.2d at 737 (7th Cir. 1987) (finding that a
private searcher motivated to aid investigation after contacting government
agents not acting as government agent where government did not request
involvement and she had other motivations) (emphasis added).
58 United States v. Hall, 142 F.3d 988, 993 (7th Cir. 1998).
59 Id.
60 Id. (emphasis added).
61 Cf United States v. Jarrett, 338 F.3d 339 (4th Cir. 2003). See
discussion infra pp. 13-14.
2004-2005
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government, at least one federal court explicitly regards the
government agent analysis as a "difficult issue."62
In United States v. Feffer, a private searcher met with
government agents to discuss her discovery of evidence that the
defendant falsified his tax returns.63 After this meeting, the
private searcher searched the defendant's financial papers
again. 64 The court noted several factors in its analysis of the
application of the Fourth Amendment. First, although in this
second search the searcher's motivation was in part to aid law
enforcement, it was not her only goal. 65 More significantly, the
government never requested documents from the private
searcher nor expected to receive anything after their initial
contact. 66 Last, the court noted that the government did not
directly participate in collecting the evidence.67 On these bases,
the court did not suppress evidence collected from the search
conducted after the private searcher contacted the
government.6 8
The hypothetical case is analogous to Feffer in that the
government did not request that the Technician further search
the customer's computer nor did the government directly
participate in collecting the evidence. Even if, arguendo, the
Technician's motivation in the subsequent searches was to aid
the government, without government inducement to continue
searching, evidence collected should be admitted at trial.69 As
the Seventh Circuit said in United States v. Shahid,
[a] private citizen might decide to aid in the control
and prevention of criminal activity out of his or her
own moral conviction . . . or even desire to
incarcerate criminals, but even if such private
purpose should happen to coincide with the
purposes of the government, "this happy
62 Feffer, 831 F.2d at 737.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 739-40.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 739.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 739-40.
69 United States v. Shahid, 117 F.3d 322, 325 (7th Cir. 1997).
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coincidence does not make a private actor an arm of
the government." 70
A private search can be converted into a government
search only where the government exercises power over the
private searcher. 71 Based on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
governing non-computer searches, the evidence collected by the
Technician in searches before and after contacting the
government would be admitted.
In 2003, the Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Jarrett,72
departed from traditional doctrine. The court significantly
relaxed the government agent test for Fourth Amendment
purposes. 73 The court held that prior email contact between the
government and a private citizen and passive acceptance by the
government of a private search by this citizen did not make the
private citizen a government agent. 74 In Jarrett, the private
citizen hacked into the defendant's computer in search of child
pornography ("the Jarrett searches").75  Finding child
pornography, the private citizen hacker then copied the
electronic files and turned them over to the FBI.7 6
The government was aware the private citizen had
conducted a similar search a year before ("the first search"). 77
In the first search, the private citizen discovered electronic files
by hacking into a computer and delivered them to the FBI,
aiding the FBI in identifying a different defendant. 78 Between
the first search and the Jarrett searches, the FBI had exchanged
emails with the private citizen. 79 In these emails, the private
citizen discussed his intent to continue hacking into child
pornographers' computers and the government made "a vague
offer of availability to receive more information in the future."80
70 Id. at 326 (quoting United States v. Koenig, 856 F.2d 847,
850-51 (7th Cir. 1998)).
71 Id. at 325 (quoting Koenig, 856 F.2d at 849-50).
72 338 F.3d 339 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding no Fourth Amendment
violation where FBI knew of and tacitly acknowledged warrantless search by
hacker searching for electronic evidence), discussed infra p.7.
73 See id.
74 Id. at 341-42 (4th Cir. 2003).
75 Id. at 342.
76 Id.
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Despite this contact, the court held that because the government
was "under no special obligation to affirmatively discourage [the
hacker] from hacking," the government's knowledge did not
make the private citizen hacker a government agent.81
Although the Fourth Circuit described the government's
behavior as "discomforting," and noted that the government
"operated close to the line" in its contact with the hacker, it
upheld the search.8
2
Whether or not the result is preferable for policy reasons
(which it may be), this court appears to be collapsing a multi-
part test 8 3 into one factor: whether the government encouraged
the additional searching. But for (a) the first search, that is, a
previous case in which the hacker turned over evidence to the
FBI, (b) the hacker's email indicating intent to do so again, and
(c) the FBI's reply "vaguely" indicating willingness to receive
more information, the court's holding would be in line with
existing doctrine. These departures, however, are in conflict
with other circuits' analyses.
The government in the hypothetical case did not
encourage the Technician to search Defendant X's computer
further. The Technician's continued searching was conducted of
his own volition and even if his motivation was to aid law
enforcement, his contact with the government does not give rise
to an agency relationship. In light of this, courts will probably
admit evidence collected after contacting the government.8 4 The
conduct does not approach that of the hacker in Jarrett who,
despite concomitant "discomforting" government behavior, was
still not considered a government agent.8 5 In all circuits, the
evidence collected during the Technician's searches after
contacting the government will be admitted.
81 Id.
82 United States v. Jarrett, 338 F.3d 339, 347 (4th Cir. 2003).
83 Discussed, supra Part I.C.
84 But see Barth, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 936. In Barth, a technician
discovered incriminating files, contacted the government and conducted a
further search of the customer's computer. Id. The court held that once the
technician contacted law enforcement officials, he became a government actor
and suppressed evidence collected even though he did not continue searching
at the government's request or with its tacit approval. Id.
85 Jarrett, 338 F.3d at 347.
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2. SCOPE OF SUBSEQUENT GOVERNMENT
SEARCHES
The government may conduct a search or seizure
following the private search without a warrant if the scope of the
search mirrors that of the private citizen's search.8 6 In such an
event, no warrant is required because the private, legal search
has destroyed any legitimate expectation of privacy in the
package's contents.8 7 That is, the government may view all files
viewed by the Technician without obtaining a warrant because
Defendant X's expectation of privacy in those files is destroyed.
88
The capacity to claim Fourth Amendment protection
depends on whether a person had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the invaded place.8 9 "If the files were closed and their
contents not apparent from the exterior, the reasonable
expectation of privacy continue[s] [only] so long as the files had
not been searched before contact with the government
occurred." 90  The government may re-open and view any
computer files searched by the technician. 91 Further, courts
may not suppress some files the government viewed beyond
those viewed by the Technician. The boundaries establishing the
scope of subsequent law enforcement searches of Defendant X's
computer, where that search might include files not viewed by
the technician, are as yet unsettled. 92
The Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Carey, excluded
electronic evidence of child pornography from an officer's search
86 Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 115.
87 Id. at 118-22.
88 See New York v. Emerson, 766 N.Y.S.2d 482, 486 (Sup. Ct.
2003) (citing Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 119).
89 U.S. v. McNeal, 77 F.3d 938, 945 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143)).
90 United States v. Knoll, 16 F.3d 1313, 1320 (2d Cir. 1994)
(emphasis added).
91 See Emerson, 766 N.Y.S.2d at 487.
92 The law regarding the acceptable scope of government
searches of a computer pursuant to a warrant is also unsettled. Cf Carey,
172 F.3d at 1272-75 (discussing acceptable scope of computer search
pursuant to terms of a warrant); United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591, 595-
96 (9th Cir. 1982) (discussing acceptable scope of "intermingled documents"
pursuant to terms of a warrant). Although technology exists that can indicate
which files were viewed when, it is not reliable. The technology cannot
always detect who viewed files when. Further a particularly savvy user can
view files without leaving a trace.
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pursuant to a valid warrant. 93 The warrant authorized the
officer to search the defendant's computers for drug-related files,
including "'names, telephone numbers, ledger receipts,
addresses, and other documentary evidence pertaining to the
sale and distribution of controlled substances.' 94 The detective
and a computer technician conducted the search by viewing the
directories (containing lists of file names) of the defendant's
computers' hard drives. 95  The detective noticed "sexually
suggestive titles and the label 'JPG."'96  In order to search the
actual contents of the files, the detective used a government
computer to search "text-based" files on disks copied from the
defendant's computers for certain key words.97 The detective
then viewed the image files from the defendant's computers
because he believed they "could contain evidence pertinent to a
drug investigation such as pictures of 'a hydroponic growth
system and how it's set up to operate."'98
Although the search produced no text files "related to
drugs," the detective opened files that contained child
pornography.9 9 It was not his discovery of evidence of other
crimes that per se violated the warrant, rather the fact that the
files had sexually suggestive titles which should have indicated
their content. 100 The officer should have obtained a second
warrant to continue searching for child pornography based on
the probable cause he discovered while searching for the drug-
related files. 10 1
93 See Carey, 172 F.3d at 1276.
94 Id. at 1270 (quoting the warrant's text).
95 See id.
96 Id. at 1270-71. The file extension, ".jpg" typically indicates an
image file.
97 The detective searched for 'names, telephone numbers,
ledger receipts, addresses, and other documentary evidence pertaining to the
sale and distribution of controlled substances."' Id. at 1271.
98 Id., n.2. The detective testified later, however, that when he
discovered the first JPG file, "he did not know what it was nor had he ever
experienced an occasion in which the label 'JPG' was used by drug dealers to
disguise text files." Id. Although it is unlikely that the detective was
searching for drug-related files when he opened the image files because he
knew their titles were sexually suggestive but not that they were, in fact,
images, the detective's statement that image files could include drug-related
files is valid.
99 Id. at 1270-71.
100 Id.
101 Id at 1276-77.
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The court in Frasier v. Indiana10 2 faced a similar set of
facts. An officer searching a computer pursuant to a warrant
authorizing a search for drug-related files discovered evidence of
child pornography. 10 3  The officer then obtained a second
warrant to search for child pornography and the court did not
suppress the evidence obtained pursuant to the second
warrant. 10 4 The court distinguished itself from Careyby noting
that the officer opened ambiguously labeled computer files only
then to discover child pornography, whereas in Carey the files
were undisputedly sexually suggestive.1
0 5
The court paid special attention to the fact that a file can
be deliberately mislabeled in order to deceive and therefore held
police should not be forced to rely on a defendant's own labeling
of his computer files. 106 Drawing an analogy, the court noted
that
a computer image file is akin to a photograph
sealed in an envelope or folder. And the name given
to the file is like a label stuck onto the envelope or
folder. Although such a label might say "Tax
Records," the photograph inside could be of a nude
child. Likewise, a computer image file containing
child pornography could easily be named "tax_
records.xls," in an attempt to hide its actual
contents. The approach suggested by [the
defendant] would require the police to rely upon the
name and file extension given to a file in order to
determine its contents .... An officer searching for
one type of record on a computer should not be
forced to rely upon the name given to a file, which
might very well hide its actual contents. In order to
find out what is contained in the file, it must
102 794 N.E.2d 449 (Ind. App. 2003).
103 Id. at 453.
104 Id. at 455.
105 Id. at 465-66 (emphasis added). In order to satisfy
particularity requirements, warrants for electronic evidence should describe
either physical hardware to be seized (i.e., an entire computer), or the
category of information to be searched for (e.g., "all records relating to an
elaborate fraud scheme"). COMPUTER CRIME & INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
DIVISION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS
AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 88-89
(2002), available at http:// www.cybercrime.gov/s&smanual2002.htm (last
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necessarily be "opened" in some way to ascertain its
contents.107
Regarding initial private searches, rather than initial
searches pursuant to a warrant authorizing an officer to search
for evidence of unrelated crimes, courts also disagree as to the
permissible scope of a later government search. In United States
v. Runyan,10 8 a contested government search exceeded the scope
of the initial private search because the government searched
beyond computer disks examined initially by the defendant's
wife. On the other hand, in United States v. Grimes,10 9 the
government seized only what the repair technician viewed
during an initial search and therefore did not exceed the initial
search scope.
In another possible expansion of the Fourth Amendment
in 2003, a New York state court stretched the permissible scope
of a warrantless government search following a private search in
New York v. Emerson.110 The government examined additional
files but was held not to have exceeded the scope of the initial
private search.111 In Emerson, the court held that FBI agents
could look at files the private citizen had not viewed during the
private search without violating the Fourth Amendment.
Both Emerson and Jarrett will impact future warrantless
searches. The courts were presented with fact patterns where
the government acted beyond previously recognized boundaries
of warrantless searches in two different areas. The government
did not violate the Fourth Amendment in either case. Emerson
and Jarrett do not change the requirement that the government
must obtain a second warrant if it has possession of a computer
and discovers probable cause to search for evidence of a second
crime. Courts following Jarrett, however, might admit evidence
obtained by non-government-agent hackers or other private
searchers where the government knew of or acquiesced to but
did not explicitly, affirmatively encourage the search. Courts not
following Jarrett will continue to interpose a more obvious
dividing line between agent and non-agent status by requiring
that the government not know of the continued private search.
107 Frasier, 794 N.E.2d at 465-66.
108 275 F.3d 449 (5th Cir. 2001).
109 244 F.3d 375 (5th Cir. 2001).
110 766 N.Y.S.2d. 482 (Sup. Ct. 2003).
111 Id. at 494-95.
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Courts following Emerson may admit electronic evidence
collected by the government where the government did not
obtain a warrant to search additional files on a defendant's
computer after a private citizen examined only a few files.
Courts will be forced to address the permissible Fourth
Amendment scope. Courts could define the scope narrowly,
restricting it to electronic files in the same sub-folder or folder as
the files viewed by the private searcher. Courts could also define
the scope more broadly, by admitting government-viewed files in
the same drive partition or computer as files viewed by the
private searcher. Courts may constrict the permissible scope and
treat each individual file separately, as a piece of evidence that
must have been viewed by the private searcher before the
government can view it without a warrant. Courts may expand
the scope and treat each computer separately, enabling the
government to view every file without a warrant. Courts might
also find middle ground by differentiating among folders or sub-
folders; under this theory, the private searcher, by viewing one
file in a folder would enable the government to view all of the
other files in just that folder.
Returning to the hypothetical case, in order to search
other areas of Defendant X's computer, most courts will require
the government to obtain a valid search warrant. The
government may use evidence obtained by the Technician to
establish probable cause requisite to obtain a search warrant. 112
In order to establish probable cause to search, the affidavits
must include a "'fair probability that contraband or evidence of a
crime' will be found in the location identified in the search
warrant."1
13
Most cases regarding evidence collected during computer
technicians' searches involve discovery of files indicating
possible criminal child pornography possession. 114 Also, in most
cases, electronic pictures discovered by a technician contain
evidence of child pornography sufficient to establish probable
cause for a search warrant.1 15 In the hypothetical case, the files
discovered by the technician must indicate a fair probability
112 Hall, 142 F.3d at 995.
113 Id. at 995 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)).
114 See, e.g., Grimes, 244 F.3d at 378; Hall, 142 F.3d at 995.
115 See, e.g., Id. at 378; Hall, 142 F.3d at 995. But see United
States v. Harned, 182 F.3d 928, 1999 WL 362397, at **2 (9th Cir. June 2,
1999) (finding files computer technician believed to be child pornography
insufficient to establish probable cause for a search warrant).
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that evidence of the alleged crime will be found on Defendant X's
computer. 116 If this condition is met, the government can use
evidence collected by the technician's initial search - prior to
contacting the government - as probable cause for a search
warrant. 117 The government could then access or view other
files on Defendant X's computer according to the terms of a valid
warrant. 11 8
If the files discovered during the Technician's search are
not sufficient to establish probable cause, the government can
neither obtain a warrant based solely on electronic files viewed
by the Technician, nor conduct a further search of the computer
for evidence to bolster a finding of probable cause. The files
viewed in the Technician's search may, however, be used in
conjunction with other information legitimately obtained
through government investigation to establish probable cause.
Only after obtaining a valid search warrant based on other
evidence could the government then search the rest of the
customer's computer.
D. CONCLUSIONS ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE AND
PRIVATE SEARCHES
In brief, evidence obtained during the hypothetical
Technician's initial search, albeit warrantless, is admissible.
The government may use evidence collected by the Technician to
establish probable cause for a search warrant to search other
areas of the computer for additional evidence. Evidence collected
by the government in a warrantless search mirroring the
Technician's is admissible. The government can view any files
viewed by the Technician without a warrant and possibly other
files located within the same folder as those viewed by the
Technician depending on the jurisdiction and possibly turning
on the actual file names. Without a warrant, the government
may examine this limited set of files, probably those in the same
folder as the files viewed by the Technician even if not accessed
or viewed by him. Before searching other areas of Defendant X's
computer, the government must obtain a search warrant.
Certain fact patterns test the limits of existing legal
doctrine in ways that warrant careful consideration. Adding to
116 Hall, 142 F.3d at 995.
117 Grimes, 244 F.3d at 378; Hall, 142 F.3d at 995.
118 Grimes, 244 F.3d at 378; Hall, 142 F.3d at 995.
SWAMINATHA
21
SWAMINATHA: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT UNPLUGGED
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2005
YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY
the facts in the hypothetical case, I now assume the evidence
was collected without violating Defendant X's constitutional
rights. The fact that Defendant X used a wireless network and
claims that Perpetrator Y, in fact, downloaded the child
pornography, presents additional issues to which I now turn.
III. ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE AND WIRELESS INTERNET ACCESS
"Unfortunately, some people abuse public anonymity
systems by engaging in criminal actions such as large-scale
intellectual property theft, financial crimes, copyright
infringement, cyberstalking threats, child pornography, and
even terrorist instructions."'1 19
A. WIRELESS (IN)SECURITY ENABLES OFFENSES
"The modern world relies on computer security and
increasingly finds that it cannot be taken for granted." 120
Wireless Internet users like Defendant X usually do not grasp
the extent to which their computers and Internet connections
are vulnerable.1 21 The San Diego Union Tribune, to curb this
growing problem, created public service announcements to alert
people that hackers can access everything on a computer with
an improperly secured (or unsecure) wireless access point.12 2 A
computer user with basic computer skills can unintentionally
access Defendant X's electronic communications sent over his
wireless network.12 3 Every time Defendant X logs into his email
account, his username and password are sent over the wireless
network unencrypted, that is, readable by a person without
119 See Jonathan I. Edelstein, Note, Anonymity and
International Law Enforcement in Cyberspace, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 231, 250-51(1996). But see LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND
OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 26 (1999) ("[University] networks [should be open]
for anonymous use because . . . 'people should have the right to communicate
at the university anonymously, because the First Amendment to the
Constitution guarantees the same right vis-A-vis governments."' (quoting
Geoffrey Stone, Provost of the University of Chicago)).
120 Ethan Preston & John Lofton, Computer Security
Publications: Information Economics, Shifting Liability and the First
Amendment, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 71, 76 (2002).
121 Lisa Weinreb, Personal Technology.* Five Questions, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Nov. 17, 2003, at C1.
122 Id.
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computer-aided translation. 124 Wireless Internet appliances are
inherently unsecure if installed with default, out-of-the-box
configurations.
In wired networks, hackers and attackers cannot steal
electronic communications or access computers unless they are
in close physical proximity to the network. 125 The attacker must
be close enough to use "listening equipment [physically
connected to the network] to intercept waves emitted as data
flows through the network."126 In wireless networks the same
attacker could accomplish the same nefarious goals simply by
sitting in her car parked on the street in front of Defendant X's
house. "Wardriving, 127 the practice of driving around in search
of accessible wireless home or business networks is well known
in major cities. 128  Wardrivers survey and record accessible
wireless access points, often posting them on Web sites. 129
Would-be perpetrators can even enter a zip code in various
databases on Web sites1 30 and locate the nearest wireless access
point.
124 Id. Unencrypted text is readable by humans. Encrypted text
is scrambled so that it is only decryptable (and then readable) by a software
application using an algorithm and secret key. See DEBORAH RUSSELL & G.T.
GANGEMI SR., COMPUTER SECURITY BASICS 169-71 (1991); SIMSON GARFINKEL
& GENE SPAFFORD, PRACTICAL UNIX AND INTERNET SECURITY 142-46 (1996).
125 TARA M. SWAMINATHA & CHARLES R. ELDEN, WIRELESS
SECURITY AND PRIVACY: BEST PRACTICES AND DESIGN TECHNIQUES 45 (2002).
The goal of wireless security is to approach that of wired networks. Id.
126 Id.
127 "War driving" gets its name from a practice popular in the
1980s called "war dialing." War dialers called phone numbers at random
searching for unprotected modems through which they gained access to
networks. Id. at 188.
128 Leigh Dyer, Security Key For Wireless Networks, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER, Nov. 15, 2003, at IA.
129 According to the World Wide War Drive, wardriving is not the
practice of attempting unauthorized access to unsecure networks. Its aim is
to "generate awareness of the need by individual users and companies to
secure their access [by] occasionally conduct[ing] informal surveys across the
globe to determine how many wireless access points are detectable and
unsecured." At http://www.worldwidewardrive.org/faq.html (Dec. 18, 2003).
The website includes a page on ethics, encouraging users to abide by laws
and not access networks, merely note their existence.
http://www.worldwidewardrive.org/ethics.html.
130 See, e.g., NetStumbler's database, at
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Warchalking is another method of finding access points
and making their locations known to others. Warchalkers make
symbols using chalk on building walls or pavement to indicate a
spot where one could access a wireless network. The symbols are
universal in the United States and abroad 131 and they could
alert would-be perpetrators to Defendant X's (or even
Corporation Z's) free Internet connection. Businesses who do not
secure wireless Internet connections arguably open themselves
to even more serious threats than home users. 132 Warchalking
is not as pervasive as once predicted. 133 Searching online
Wardriving databases is still more efficient for would-be
perpetrators attempting to locate unwitting users' wireless
Internet access.
The goal of wireless security is to approach the security of
wired networks. 134  Although inherently unsecure, wireless
access points can be configured so that they are more secure
than their default configurations. The easiest ways to bolster
security on a wireless access point are to enable wireless
encryption, allow access only to IDs of specified wireless network
cards, 135 and by not broadcasting the access point's ID. 136 While
not failsafe, using encryption 137 protects against inadvertent,
unintentional access to Defendant X's wireless Internet
connection. 138  Enabling encryption also protects against
significantly more intentional attempts.
131 See Warchalking.org's symbol pocket guide, at
http ://www.blackbeltjones.com/warchalking/warchalkingO-9.pdf.
132 Connecting to a business's wireless access point gives the
hacker access to the company's corporate network behind the company's
firewall affording access to sensitive internal data as well as facilitating
general Internet access.
133 See Nick Langley, The Demise Of Warchalkers, COMPUTER
WEEKLY, June 25, 2003, at 36.
134 SWAMINATHA & ELDEN, supra note 125, at 45.
135 MAC address filtering.
136 Its SSID.
137 The most prevalent wireless standards in the United States
are versions of 802.11 (e.g., 802.11b). Wireless encryption deployed with
virtually all 802.11 wireless access points is called Wired Equivalent Privacy
(WEP). SWAMINATHA & ELDEN, supra note 125, at 45. Early versions of WEP
were broken in the Spring of 2001. Id. at 47. The current state of WEP, while
not unbreakable, affords protection against unintentional or passive access
and all but the most diligent and skilled hackers. See id. at 48.
138 Tyler Hamilton, Beware Roving Hackers, Wireless
Networkers Are Warned, Recent Arrest Underlines Systems' Vulnerability,
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The concern at hand is not whether this intentional access
is an offense. Recall that people like the alleged Perpetrator Y
who intentionally use another's wireless Internet connection are
violating several federal laws. 139 Is the potential for wireless
crimes merely hype? Prior to November 2003, the concerns
about individuals like Perpetrator Y committing crimes by
usurping wireless connections were only theoretical, albeit
highly possible; no wireless crimes had been identified or
charged. In the last two months of 2003, wireless crimes were
charged. In North Carolina, a man pled guilty to two felony
counts and one misdemeanor for accessing confidential patient
records via a hospital's wireless network. 140 In Detroit, three 20-
year-olds faced federal criminal charges for attempting to
misappropriate credit cards by hacking a store's wireless
network, which caused damages in excess of $2.5 Million dollars
according to the government; two pled guilty in May 2004.141
While there are endless concerns regarding unsecure
wireless networks, 142 the concern at hand is that without
Owners Could Find Themselves Accused Of Crimes, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 24,
2003, at D03.
139 Intentional access to Defendant X's wireless network violated,
inter alia, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030, 2511, 2520, and 2701. See supra pp. 4-5.
140 See Gary Villani, Landmark Conviction Handed Down In
Cyber Case, HOLLY SPRINGS SUN, Nov. 19, 2003, available at
http://www.hollyspringssun.com/news/2003111900438.html (last accessed
Dec. 2, 2003). The man was sentenced to 18 months in prison and ordered to
pay $10,000 restitution to the victim. Id.
141 See Dyer, supra note 128. The three were indicted on charges
of conspiracy, wire fraud, computer fraud, unauthorized computer access,
intentional transmission of computer code, and attempted possession of
unauthorized access devices for accessing the store's wireless network more
than ten times in three weeks. Three Indicted For Alleged Hacking GRAND
RAPIDS PRESS, Nov. 21, 2003, at A2. The first two to plead guilty will face
shorter sentences in consideration for cooperation with law enforcement by
disclosing details about the intrusions. The third has been arraigned but no
further information is available yet regarding his plea or conviction. See
Roberts, Paul, Michigan Man Pleads Guilty to Wireless Hack Into Stores,
COMPUTERWORLD (Jun. 7, 2004), available at
http ://www.computerworld.com/securitytopics/security/holes/story/O, 10801,93
708,00.html (last visited October 14, 2004).
142 Files that should be protected could be stolen. Medical records
in hospitals, legal documents in law firms or government documents in
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encryption or other security mechanisms, 143 anyone near
Defendant X's house can access his network and use his Internet
connection to commit offenses. 144 In November 2003, Toronto
police reported the first offense committed via an unsecure
wireless network. The facts are comparable to the hypothetical
case set forth in this paper. In Toronto, police pulled over a car
headed the wrong way on a one-way street. 145 The driver ("the
Toronto driver") was watching a pornographic video on a laptop
computer on his front seat. 146 The Toronto Driver apparently
hijacked a residential wireless Internet connection and was
using it to view the pornographic video. 147 He was charged with
possession of child pornography,148  the first such charge
committed via a wireless network in Canada. 149 While the
Toronto Driver committed the first crime using an innocent
person's wireless Internet connection, the differences between
this case and Perpetrator Y's are significant.
First and foremost, the police caught the Toronto Driver
in the act. His unknowing Internet access provider, the wireless
connection owner whose connection he used to view the child
pornography, will not have difficulty proving her innocence.
Defendant X, on the other hand, has no proof that Perpetrator Y
is the true offender. 150 As George DuPont has observed, "[d]ue
to advances in technology and the emergence of cyberspace,
personal identities and physical locations are far more easily
143 Security products called Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) can
also bolster security. See, e.g., SWAMINATHA & ELDEN, supra note 125, at 135-
150; Sherman, supra note 123, at 41.
144 See Hamilton, supra note 138, at D03.
145 Id.; Half-Naked Man Stole Wireless Web Access, Was Looking
At Child Porn, CANADIAN PRESS, Nov. 22, 2003.
146 Hamilton, supra note 138.
147 Id.
148 The article cites a Toronto Police press release. The press
release was unavailable on the Toronto Police website,
http://www.torontopolice.on.ca/. Emails to the contact for press release
inquiries returned undelivered.
149 Hamilton, supra note 138.
150 There are network monitoring tools Defendant X could have
used to allow him to gather some information and/or records about
Perpetrator Y's access and activity. It is highly unlikely Defendant X would
not secure his wireless access point but wouldbe able to install, configure and
understand network monitoring tools. See, e.g., STANFORD LINEAR
ACCELERATION CENTER, NETWORK MONITORING TOOLS, at
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cloaked in anonymity and pseudo-anonymity than ever
before." 151
B. DEFENDANT X'S CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LIABILITY
Wireless Internet access issues parallel existing theories
of liability and culpability in other legal disciplines but present
new challenges. Courts now must grapple with these challenges.
Prosecuting Perpetrator Y for unauthorized access to Defendant
X's home computer via his wireless network or for unauthorized
use of Defendant X's wireless Internet connection is the tip of
the iceberg.
Still in infant stages, wireless Internet legal issues cannot
yet be comprehensively analyzed. Defendant X faces several
problems in defending himself against crimes he alleges
Perpetrator Y committed and potential civil claims against him
by third parties. As stated earlier, the issues analyzed under
existing law highlight problems that arise by drawing analogies
to existing theories of liability.
1. BURDENS OF PROOF AND DEFENDANT X'S
DEFENSES
Ethan Preston and John Lofton believe that "[t]he
fundamental problem recognized by legal commentary is that
perpetrators of computer crime are not only difficult to identify;
they are difficult to apprehend and prosecute or sue."152 The
government must prove each element of a crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. 153 Criminal possession statutes in general
usually require "knowingly receiving an item" or "retention after
awareness of control over it."154
151 George F. du Pont, The Time Has Come for Limited Liability
for Operators of True Anonymity Remailers in Cyberspace: An Examination
of the Possibilities and Perils, 6 J. TECH. L. & POLY 3 (proposing limited
liability for remailer operators).
152 Ethan Preston & John Lofton, Computer Security
Publications: Information Economics, Shifting Liability and the First
Amendment, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 71, 80 (2002).
153 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW §§ 1.8(a), (b)
(2d ed. 2003).
154 Id. at § 6.1(e) (internal citations omitted).
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Possession of child pornography, the federal crime with
which Defendant X is charged, allegedly committed by
Perpetrator Y, includes an element of scienter. 155 Courts cannot
impose criminal responsibility in obscenity crimes without
requiring proof of some level of knowledge on the part of the
defendant. 15 6 Defendant X will not be found guilty unless the
prosecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant X
"knowingly" possessed child pornography. 15 7  In existing case
law where a defendant contests the prosecution's argument that
the defendant knowingly possessed child pornography images,
the defendant typically argues that he did not know the persons
depicted in the images were minors. 158  Few, if any, child
pornography cases involve a defendant who argues he did not
know he actually possessed the images. The scienter element
regarding a possession offense concerns the physical object,
however, and not its properties.15 9 If the government cannot
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant X knew he
physically possessed the images on his computer, a court cannot
find him guilty.
Defendant X has still more significant hurdles to clear,
however. Courts and legislatures create rebuttable
presumptions when a defendant is found in possession of
evidence. 160  One rebuttable presumption, "the presumption
from recent exclusive unexplained possession of stolen property,
[is that] the possessor stole it."161 Criminal statutes sometimes
make proof of a physical fact presumptive or prima facie
evidence of a separate mental element required in order to
convict a defendant. 162 This presumption gives the government
a necessary advantage yet can be rebutted by a defendant.
In jurisdictions where the prosecution has the benefit of
this presumption, Defendant X will have a difficult - almost
impossible - time rebutting the presumption. Courts should
155 See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(A)(5)(b).
156 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765 (1982) (citing Smith v.
California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87
(1974)).
157 Id.
158 See e.g., Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765-66; Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 255 (2002).
159 LAFAVE, supra note 153 at § 6.1(e).
160 LAFAVE, supra note 153 at § 1.8(f) ("courts have created





Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 7 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol7/iss1/3
ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE
take into account the fact that wireless networks are inherently
unsecure when determining whether to grant the prosecution a
rebuttable presumption that the evidence on a defendant's
computer (a) belongs to the defendant or (b) can be used to prove
a scienter element. Wired networks are not altogether secure,
but are more secure than wireless networks. As a result, there
may be legitimate reasons for treating one differently from the
other. Although this is not unlike other non-electronic evidence
(e.g., that a defendant might argue drugs in his home were not
his), the level of expertise required to adequately secure wired
and non-wired networks should persuade courts to remove the
presumption, relieving a defendant of the burden of proving
electronic evidence found on his computer is not in fact his. This
situation would be appealing to Defendant X because the
hypothetical facts indicate that he may be an innocent,
unknowing and an unwitting intermediary in Perpetrator Y's
crime. If such defendants have no method by which they can
introduce evidence to rebut the presumption, the presumption
should not be granted.
Because both the average computer owner and Defendant
X probably lack the expertise and resources required to show
that someone else used their wireless networks and put files on
their computers, the presumption is dangerous. One solution
might be for courts to allow affirmative defenses that effectively
rebut presumptions. In order to avail himself of the affirmative
defense, Defendant X could cooperate with the government,
allowing government technology experts to examine his
computer to attempt to determine what user placed evidence on
the computer. This scenario does not solve all problems, but it
might help cooperative innocent defendants while still
identifying guilty defendants. The success of this solution
depends on the government technology experts' capabilities in
examining computers for evidence. If the government cannot
determine the identity of the perpetrator after examining the
computer, the affirmative defense and burden-shifting does not
solve any of the previous problems.
Because these cases are highly fact-specific, courts will
not be able to create bright line rules without difficulty. If the
courts altogether remove the rebuttable presumption regarding
electronic evidence in general or electronic evidence on a
wireless Internet user's computer, other problems arise.
Removing the presumption would create an easy escape route
for actual perpetrators. They could claim their networks were
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usurped or their computers hacked. The government would then
face an almost insurmountable task of proving a defendant was,
in fact, the person who downloaded child pornography or
committed another crime via the unsecure wireless connection.
In the hypothetical case in this paper, Defendant X may
be able to avail himself of an established affirmative defense.
The defendant has the burden of introducing evidence in support
of an affirmative defense. 16 3 The federal statute under which
Defendant X is charged provides two affirmative defenses. First,
the defendant can escape prosecution by proving the individuals
in the images were, in fact, all legal adults engaged in sexual
activity who consented to having their images taken. 164 Second,
a defendant is not responsible for possession if the defendant
possesses less than three proscribed images, prevents anyone
but law enforcement officials from accessing the images, reports
the matter to law enforcement and promptly destroys such
images. 165 Defendant X would undoubtedly be willing to contact
law enforcement, prevent access (even simply by unplugging his
wireless access point), and destroy the images. If there are three
images or fewer on Defendant X's computer, he will not have to
worry about the possibility of a rebuttable presumption that he
knew the images existed because they were found on his
computer.
If there are more than three images of child pornography
on Defendant X's computer, the second affirmative defense will
not be available. Defendant X will want to introduce evidence
indicating that Perpetrator Y used Defendant X's Internet
connection to commit the offense. Records from Defendant X's
Internet Service Provider (ISP) might be of some assistance,
albeit minimal. The records would not indicate that a user other
than Defendant X accessed and downloaded child pornography
unless the events occurred at a time Defendant can prove he was
not at home. ISPs typically do not retain records indefinitely.
Relevant records of activity on Defendant X's account will
probably be purged from the ISP's records storage by the time
Defendant X requests them or the ISP attempts to retrieve
them.166
163 See id.
164 Asheroft, 535 U.S. at 261 (citing 18 USC § 2252(A)(4)).
165 Id. (citing 18 USC § 2252(A)(5)).
166 ISPs typically store documents for 30-90 days.
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This problem will arise in civil offenses as well. The suits
that the Recording Industry Association of American (RIAA) is
filing against individual users who download music in violation
of copyright laws provide a current example. In one such case
that received considerable press, the RIAA falsely accused a
woman of copyright violations arising from the illegal
downloading of thousands of songs. 167 The woman, a 66-year old
sculptor, was able to convince the RIAA to drop its copyright suit
against her because she owned a Macintosh computer (on which
the file-downloading software could not run at the time), she had
no file downloading software on her computer and claimed she
was a "computer neophyte." 168 The RIAA claimed it was certain
the IP address 169 associated with the woman's computer had
been the recipient and transmitter of thousands of copyrighted
songs.170
Either the woman's ISP matched the wrong customer
with the IP address, or the RIAA made a mistake in identifying
the IP address initially. 171 If the woman had a wireless Internet
connection, the copyright- infringing downloading and uploading
might have appeared to have originated from her IP address but
actually have been the work of another party (such as
Perpetrator Y). The fact that a defendant uses a wireless
network increases the likelihood that network activity conducted
via the defendant's Internet account was, in fact committed by
someone usurping the defendant's network.
Imposing some liability on wireless users creates an
incentive to secure their wireless networks. The notion of using
criminal law to implement this incentive is troubling. Although
the hassle of being accused of a crime might be sufficient, it is
167 See William Glanz, Music Industry Plans Second Round Of
Suits, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, Oct. 18, 2003, at AO1
168 Chris Gaither, Recording Industry Withdraws Suit: Mistaken
Identity Raises Questions on Legal Strategy, BOSTON GLOBE,
Sept. 24, 2003, at http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2003/09/24/
recording-industry-withdraws -suit/.
169 An Internet Protocol (IP) Address is a unique identifier for
any computer on the Internet. IP Addresses are not necessarily assigned to a
computer indefinitely, however, and can be dynamically allocated by an ISP.
When an ISP dynamically allocates IP Addresses, it assigns IP Addresses
arbitrarily to users for certain periods of time. One user can have used
hundreds of IP Addresses over the course of a month, making identification of
a user by her IP Address difficult.
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not a viable solution. Liability to third parties, both for wireless
network owners and wireless equipment manufacturers, might
provide a workable alternative.
2. DEFENDANT X's CIVIL LIABILITY TO THIRD
PARTIES
Defendant X may face civil liability to third parties for
failing to secure his wireless network. These claims will not
necessarily be successful but they present Defendant X with
challenges. Perpetrator Y might have hacked into Corporation
Z's private network via Defendant X's unsecure wireless
network connection. Corporation Z might bring suit against
Defendant X for damage caused, including financial loss due to
stolen proprietary information and damage caused to internal
computer or network systems.
Congress's Internet Caucus Wireless Task Force (ICWTF)
has been considering the range of wireless technologies'
technical and personal implications on public and private
users. 172 In November 2003, the ICWTF convened a panel to
informally discuss drafting legislation concerning liability and
security. 173 Panelists agreed that the "liability implications of
wireless data communications, including Wi-Fi, are unclear, and
users need to know that they are dealing with some uncharted
territory as to who can be held liable for misuse of their
networks." 174  The panel believes that although "drive-by"
downloaders or perpetrators can take advantage of unsecure
access points, liability should not extend to the private owners
for unauthorized use of their network. 175
Stephen Henderson and Matthew Yarbrough argue
otherwise. 176 Henderson and Yarbrough contend that applying
traditional negligence liability will encourage better security on
an inherently unsecure Internet. 177 Although ignorant parties
172 Mark Rockwell, Panel Examines Wi-Fl Liability Issues,
WIRELESSWEEK.COM, (Nov. 4, 2003) at
http ://wirelessweek.com/index.asp?layout=documentPrint&




176 See Stephen E. Henderson & Matthew E. Yarbrough, Suing
the Unsecure?.'A Duty of Care in Cyberspace, 32 N.M. L. REV. 11 (2002).
177 Id. at 11.
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such as Defendant X lack criminal intent, if they could be
considered knowingly unsecure with respect to a certain well-
known threat or vulnerability, third-party victims might be able
to recover damages in a tort suit. 178 Common law negligence
doctrine is relatively unexplored in the modern Internet era.
179
Two negligence factors, causation and damages, will not be
treated significantly different here than in non-computing
cases.18 0  Legal duty and an innocent access point owner's
failure to conform to reasonable standards of care, however, are
probable hotbeds for future litigation.18 1 Generally, a person is
subject to liability for negligent actions where the actions cause
physical, personal or property injury to another. To illustrate
their argument, Henderson and Yarbrough give an example of
an attack on a third-party network via the innocent party's
unsecure network. The third party network could sustain
property damage, but this alone will not give rise to liability
without the innocent person owing a duty to the third party.182
Courts, or the legislature, (possibly prompted by the ICWTF to
promulgate regulations), must decide whether Defendant X has
a duty of care to a third party victim and if so, the duty's scope.
If a duty exists, courts still must define the standard of
care required to fulfill that duty.18 3  Computer owners and
operators who are aware of potential vulnerabilities can take
steps to fix them.18 4 Their potential for liability would then
decrease. By the same token, if such owners and operators fail to
take action when they know of a vulnerability and how to fix it,
they might be subject to increased liability. Imputing knowledge
of a vulnerability, however, is elusive at best. Standards of care
are derived from industry custom, notions of reasonable care
and occasionally from relevant legislation.18 5  No existing
legislation mandates general Internet security on the part of all
who access it. Federal and state legislation requires standards of
care regarding technical security in certain industries including
the healthcare industry and financial industry.186  These
178 Id. at 14.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 14-15.
181 See id. at 15.
182 Id. at 16.
183 Id. at 17.
184 Preston & Lofton, supra note 152, at 83.
185 Id. at 18.
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standards aim to protect the confidentiality of stored
information, not specifically to prevent unsecure networks from
being exploited to perpetrate attacks and offenses.1
8 7
Nevertheless, they may guide courts' analyses.18 8 Courts cannot
define standards of care outside the context of actual cases, so
unless and until legislatures introduce standards of care, 189
negligence lawsuits, particularly against wireless Internet users
who fail to reasonably secure their access points, may arise and
increase in number.
I suggest a few potential solutions, none of which fully
resolve the problems faced by Defendant X, the government or
third party victims. First, the insurance industry might assist.
As they do for other potential liabilities, insurance companies
could define appropriate algorithms and companion actuarial
tables. Under this scheme, individuals could purchase insurance
against liability to third parties resulting from their failure to
maintain secure wired or wireless networks. This might reduce
courts' reluctance to assign civil liability, especially where
defendants use unsecure corporate wireless networks.
Furthermore, it might meet an important policy goal of
encouraging corporate wireless network administrators to
continually update their wireless network security schemes.
Second, the government could use its purchasing power to
require wireless network equipment manufacturers to produce
secure products. If government procurement processes were
designed to enforce regulations to that end, secure products
would be increasingly produced. By sheer volume required by
the government, industry will be able to produce secure products
at lower costs. The products will be more readily available to the
average user. There are possible complications resulting from
this solution. Wireless users who purchase the cheaper, non-
compliant (unsecure) wireless network equipment might be
liable to any third parties for offenses conducted via their
wireless networks for having chosen an unsecure option. If
industry manufacturers risk liability for selling supposedly-
secure products that turn out to be unsecure, this might drive up
prices of the secure devices to compensate for damage awards
paid by the manufacturers. These and other theories will
certainly be raised in courts and in legislative proposals.
187 See id.
188 See id.
189 Id. at 25.
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Courts could apply attractive nuisance theories. If courts
took judicial notice of the fact that enough of the population is
aware of the fact that wireless networks are inherently
unsecure, and if unsecure wireless networks become hotbeds of
illicit activity, courts might consider unsecure wireless networks
an attractive nuisance and assign liability to wireless network
owners on this basis. If most wireless networks were secure,
running unsecure networks would attract criminals attempting
to evade detection. Courts could also consider more technically
savvy users more likely responsible for having secure wireless
networks. While this policy mimics the higher standards of care
required for certain specialized doctors, for example, it seems
the worst suggestion of all because it creates a disincentive for
the average person to become educated on wireless security. If
the average user is deterred from learning about how to secure
her wireless network, the potential for crimes to be committed
via unknowing users' wireless networks will greatly increase.
Courts should craft careful solutions, bearing in mind how
best to assign burdens; legislatures should create incentives that
encourage an educated and more secure public. As soon as
crimes committed via unsecure wireless networks become more
prevalent, courts and legislatures will have to consider the
variety of options presented herein. Several competing interests
will define the resulting legal doctrine including: innocent
defendants' need to offer exculpatory evidence; government's
need to convict actual offenders; third parties' needs to seek
remedies from wireless offenses committed against them; and
the public policy goal of cultivating educated wireless Internet
users and secure wireless networks.
IV. CONCLUSION
Electronic evidence presents many difficult but
interesting and increasingly common issues for courts. Fourth
Amendment doctrine on warrantless searches will continue to
evolve in the face of advances in technology and changes in legal
thinking. If the courts are overly protective of defendants' rights
in this arena, the government will face difficulty in prosecuting
cases involving electronic evidence collected from a private
search. Once a critical mass of cases have percolated through
the courts, government investigators and prosecutors will be
able to better understand (1) what conduct will give rise to an
agency relationship with a private searcher, rendering evidence
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inadmissible and (2) the permissible scope of a warrantless
search following a private one.
The legal doctrine governing warrantless searches for
electronic evidence, though unsettled, is better established than
legal doctrine regarding wireless Internet access. Even where
electronic evidence is properly collected, criminal possession
cases involving wireless networks present difficult problems for
all parties involved. Investigators face challenges in identifying
perpetrators. Prosecutors face challenges in alleging and proving
scienter elements of offenses committed via wireless networks.
Defendants are met with obstacles in obtaining exculpatory
evidence where rebuttable presumptions are afforded to the
prosecution. The removal of rebuttable presumptions protects
actual perpetrators from conviction.
Defendants whose only defense to charges based on their
possession of electronic evidence is that they are "computer
neophytes" face difficulties. Courts should consider burden-
shifting defenses, whether to assign rebuttable presumptions,
what set of facts presents a question of fact for a jury, and what
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